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ABSTRACT
The urban planning literature was reviewed to determine
the extent of use of water service policy in growth manage-
ment cases. It was found to play an integral part of the
growth management systems in several cities and counties.
On the basis of these experiences, their related court tests,
and the general planning literature, the author formulated
six prerequisites for the successful use of water service
policy as a growth management tool. These are as follows:
1) the water service agency must be geographically
congruent with the area in which growth is
occurring,
2) a comprehensive plan to guide water service
extensions should be available,
3) water service policy should be only one element
in a growth management system,
4) unconstitutionally exclusionary outcomes must
not be fostered when water service policy is a
part of a growth management system,
5) the water service agency must be accountable to
a body politic, representative of it, and per-
ceived to have legitimacy to participate in a
growth management system, and
6) the utility law of the relevant state must per-
mit water service policy to be utilized for non-
utility purposes such as growth management.
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The history of the Denver Water Board since 1950 is
examined to determine whether it could have served as an
active participant in a growth management system for the
Denver metro area had one existed. While it was found that
the Denver Water Board has had significant influence on some
of the spatial distribution of growth in the Denver metro
area, it was by no means the sole actor in accommodating
growth. It was found that when the Denver Water Board decided
not to provide service to large development projects in subur-
ban areas, it was often the case that investments were made
by non-Denver Water Board water supply agencies to serve this
growth. It was also found that the Denver Water Board's
structure did not meet some of the other criteria developed
in the first chapter to qualify it as an effective candidate
for participation in a growth management system.
A speculative design for a successor to the Denver Water
Board and other suburban Denver water supply agencies was
proposed. A new entity, a metro water agency, was outlined
which would meet the criteria for an effective water service
agency and participant in a growth management system. It's
urban planning role was defined as an agency to assist local
governments direct the location, quality, and timing of
growth. It was not designed to curb aggregate metro growth.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence Susskind
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies
and Planning
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CHAPTER 1
WATER SERVICE POLICY AS A GROWTH MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE
"Extension of utility service is an important tool for
controlling the location and timing of development in a
rational, coherent, and efficient fashion."'
Barbara Ramsey
Urban Planning Attorney
"It's like the tail wagging the dog. It's kind of ludi-
crous to try to obtain the control of other aspects of
our society by controlling water or wastewater facilities.
It doesn't seem to be a rational approach."2
John Parkhurst
General Manager
Los Angeles Sanitation
District
These statements reflect divergent views regarding water
service policy as an urban growth management technique. On
one hand urban planners consider water service and the denial
thereof to be a valid, effective tool to achieving various
urban growth management objectives. On the other hand utility
experts say, "It is not for the utility to determine what the
future is going to be. To prohibit the expansion of a water
supply system to try to slow down growth--we don't think this
is proper." 3
Barbara Ramsey, "Utility Extensions:Timing and Location Control,"
Management and Control of Growth, Edited by Randall Scott, Urban Land
Institute, Washington, D.C., 1975, Vol. 2, p. 448.
2 William Forestell, "Should Water Utilities Control Growth?",
Management and Control of Growth, ofp. cit., Vol. 2, p. 458.
OIbid.
This chapter examines the role of water service policy as
a means to influence the location and timing of development,
i.e., as a growth management technique. First, from a general
perspective urban water service policy is discussed as one of
a large number of growth management tools. Second, five case
histories are presented where communities have used capital
facilities planning and in some instances water service policy
in a growth management system. Third, conclusions are drawn
from these cases and the planning literature justifying six
criteria necessary to effectively utilize water service policy
as a growth management technique.
The information in this chapter is contextual for the
succeeding chapters. Chapter 2 examines the role of the
Denver Water Board in the growth of the Denver metro area
since 1950. The six criteria developed in this chapter are
applied to the Denver Water Board to establish whether it
could serve as an effective participant in a growth management
system.
WATER SERVICE POLICY IN RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER GROWTH MANAGE-
MENT TECHNIQUES
In a 1974 National Science Foundation supported report
Robert Einsweiler and others prepared a comprehensive list of
57 specific techniques available for utilization in what they
called municipal growth guidance systems. They further
grouped these techniques into 18 categories which are listed
below. "The techniques are listed in a general order from
-6-
most permanent to most easily changed, from highest to lowest
degree of intervention in the market, and from most powerful
to least powerful." 4
1. Public Acquisition - This includes fee simple
acquisition, land banking, compensable regulation,
and less than fee simple acquisition.
2. Public Improvements - This refers to availability
of necessary facilities essential for development
such as water and sewer service and access to roads
and highways.
3. Environmental Controls - Pollution controls, wet-
land controls, and critical area regulations.
4. Development Rights Transfer
5. Restrictive Covenants
6. Zoning Techniques - This category includes conven-
tional zoning, PUD regulation, and performance
zoning.
7. Subdivision Regulation
8. Regulation for Permanent Population Control -
Agricultural zoning, height restrictions, etc.
9. Controls Relating to Adequacy of Off-Site Facilities
10. Exactions - This includes dedication of land or cap-
ital facilities and low-income housing requirements.
4Robert Einsweiler, et. al., "Comparative Descriptions of Selected
Municipal Growth Guidance Systems," Management and Control of Growth,
op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 290.
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11. Tax and Fee Systems - Preferential taxation, devel-
opment districts, and special assessments.
12. Annexation
13. Official Mapping
14. Capital Programming Process - This is the timed
allocation of public investments.
15. Official Plans
16. Geographic Restraints - Urban service areas
17. Numerical Restraints or Quotas - Population caps,
annual permits, fair share allocations.
18. Other Planning and Management Techniques - Moratoria,
Environmental Impact Assessment, Information and
Education.
It is no surprise that land acquisition techniques and
availability of public services rank at the top of the list.
These relate to the fundamental requirements for development
to proceed, that is, land itself and service to that land by
water, sewer, and transportation improvements. All the other
elements of growth guidance systems are moot if land is not
available for development or the essential elements of human
survival and mobility are absent. The factors of land owner-
ship and utility availability are indeed powerful influences
on urban growth.
An American Society of Planning Officials' conducted
literature review on growth management systems confirmed the
-8-
intuitive notion that water service policy was a more influ-
ential factor in growth management in the more arid climes.
"The impact of water investments on development is clearly
more significant in those areas of the country that have in-
adequate water supplies. Certain sections of the West, South-
west, and Southeast portions of the nation must rely on the
transmission of potable water from considerable distances.
In these cases, development even at low densities has tended
to be related to the availability of a water supply system.
In areas where there is a real or potential water shortage,
extensions to water distribution systems might be successfully
used to influence future development if the public can control
the system."'
Simply because a technique is powerful does not mean
that it is useful to be employed in actual situations or even
ought to be employed. Every technique must be evaluated on
the basis of criteria relating to the effectiveness, equity,
and actual availability of that technique. Using a specific
strategy in one situation does not imply that it would be
useful if, for example, different objectives for community
growth existed or governmental arrangements were not condu-
cive to that strategy.
4American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO), Local Capital
Improvements and Development Management:Literature Synthesis, Frank S. So,
Project Manager, Chicago, Illinois, 1977, pp. 42-43.
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GROWTH MANAGEMENT CASES WITH WATER OR UTILITY SERVICE POLICY
AS AN ELEMENT
Water service decisions are normally capital facility
programming decisions. The rise in interest in the use of
capital facilities as a growth management tool can in part be
attributed to the wide-spread belief that not to do so results
inevitably in poor growth management, or worse yet (to the
urban planner) no growth management. "A qualitative case
study of sewer and water delivery systems in Knoxville,
Tennessee, found that the absence of consistent sewer and water
extension policies resulted in urban sprawl. Willingness on
the part of the institutions to construct main and intercep-
tors wherever and whenever a request is made ... not only
hinders efforts to guide urban growth but, in fact, fosters
urban sprawl."'
"A recent survey of 105 communities that identify them-
selves as engaged in growth management shows the percentage
that use techniques directly involving public improvements:
59% use the location of facilities to influence growth, 43%
use capital programming to influence growth timing, and 55%
use the control of access to existing facilities. Thirty-four
percent of the communities indicated that they intended to use
capital programming techniques to influence growth timing.
This ranked among the few tools that were not in use but in
which communities expressed interest."'
' ASPO, op. cit., p. 42.
7 Ibid. p. 20.
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The following are some case studies frequently referred
to in the literature of the role of capital improvements in
growth management.
Petaluma, California
A small town with 1970 population of 24,870 Petaluma
found itself becoming a commuter suburb of San Francisco. In
order to slow growth and match the growth of public facilities
with the ability of the city to pay for infrastructure the
city developed a 5-year development strategy. In order to
limit growth to 50 housing units per year it assigned points
to developer housing proposals on the basis of two sets of
criteria. The first category included utility and public
service criteria such as the ready capacity of water and sewer
systems, fire protection, school absorption, and street capac-
ity near the proposed development. The second category in-
cluded factors related to the quality of the housing proposed
and contribution to public welfare and city amenities. Other
elements in this growth guidance system in addition to a plan,
location of facilities to influence growth, and annual permit
limits were acquisition, controls relating to the adequacy of
off-site facilities, money in lieu of capital facilities,
special permits, annexation policy, low income housing require-
ments, and PUD provisions.'9
"Robert Einsweiler, et. al., op. cit., p. 321.
Robert Meyer, "Petaluma: Five-Year Development Strategy," Management
and Control of Growth, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 268..
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In January 1974 the Petaluma plan was initially declared
unconstitutional by a federal district court on the right to
travel argument. "The court ruled that the basic constitu-
tional rule is that no city can regulate its population growth
numerically so as to preclude residents from any other area
from traveling into and establishing residence there."'0 The
objectionable feature of the plan to the district court was
apparently the numerical limit placed upon annual building
permits. The Court of.Appeals reversed this finding and up-
held Petaluma's position that "The concept of public welfare
is sufficiently broad to include the city's interest in pre-
serving its small town characteristics."" The courts obvi-
ously tried to balance the rights of the residents of Petaluma
with the rights of those who wanted to move to Petaluma.
Ramapo, New York
This suburban New York town enacted a scheme for con-
trolling the timing of its residential development. It en-
acted a zoning ordinance which established a requirement for
a special permit for development to proceed regardless of the
existing zoning. The permit is granted if the developer's
proposal indicates that his land will be served by a certain
minimum level of community facilities. The town developed an
18-year capital improvement program for its sewerage, parks
and recreation areas, roads, and firehouses. Thus, the rate
at which the town implements its capital improvements plan
'
0 Ibid., p. 270.
11 ASPO, op. cit. , p. 64.
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governs the rate at which developer proposals will meet the
criteria for a special permit. Land not served by capital
facilities receives reduced taxation because of its status of
being held for deferred development.
The Ramapo plan was fully litigated and its validity
affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. Quoting from the
majority opinion, "It represents both in its inception and
implementation a reasonable attempt to provide for the sequen-
tial, orderly development of land in conjunction with the
needs of the community ... while simultaneously obviating the
blighted aftermath which the initial failure to provide needed
facilities so often bring. In sum, where it is clear that the
existing physical and financial resources of the community are
inadequate to furnish the essential services and facilities
which a substantial increase in population requires, there is
a rational basis for phased growth and hence, the challenged
ordinance is not violative of the Federal and State Constitu-
tions. It is a first practical step toward controlled growth
achieved without foresaking broader social purpose."'"
One commentator on the Ramapo plan has listed the virtues
of the approach which allowed it to pass legal muster." First,
the taking issue wasn't invoked because development wasn't
stopped but rather deferred over a period of time the court
1 2 Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 285 N.E. 2d
291 (1972).
1 3 Herbert Franklin, "Controlling Urban Growth:But for Whom?",
Management and Control of Growth, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 88.
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did not find to be unreasonable. Second, the zoning wasn't
exclusionary because equal protection, right to travel, and
due process guarantees hadn't been violated. Specifically,
growth had not been stopped or arbitrarily limited but rather
the town has adopted a plan for public investment to assimi-
late growth.
Coon Rapids, Minnesota
Coon Rapids' population increased by 500% in the '50's,
doubled in the '60's, and leveled off to a still high 4% per
year in the '70's. It was the fastest growing suburb in the
Twin Cities area. It is a low density community with only
34,000 people within its 26 square mile area. Its growth
management goals are to avoid further leapfrog development,
promote in-filling of land already served by utilities, and
preserve natural areas and appropriate open spaces.
A key feature of its growth management plan was establish-
ment of a development district beyond which subdivision plats
with lots less than 5 acres would not be considered and util-
ities including water service would not be extended. Other
elements of its growth guidance system were deferred tax assess-
ments of parcels outside the development district boundaries,
mandatory contribution to public facilities, and special zoning
techniques. According to its City Manager these development
controls have meant that "Coon Rapids has been able to avoid
,many of the typical problems of rapidly developing suburbs."
14John Cottingham, "Coon Rapids:Development District," Management
and Control of Growth, oD. cit., Vol. 3, p. 272.
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Prince George's County, Maryland
"Prince George's County has realized a rather high degree
of success with its water and sewerage plan in controlling
land use and development. At the present time, approximately
50% of the land area of the county is in a nondevelopment,
system staging category requiring a minimum of two acres per
home site. No other land use control device has been more
successful in achieving a low growth or controlled profile
than this plan."1'
The system works through a comprehensive 10-year water
and sewer plan, a county capital improvement program, strin-
gent subdivision regulations and other measures. The pro-
gram's legal validity has been upheld.1
Salem, Oregon
Utilizing an urban service area approach, the City of
Salem has utilized its water and sewer utility authority and
its annexation power to slow scattered residential develop-
ment outside its boundaries. It was assisted in this objec-
tive by the creation of a Boundary Commission including
county participation to wield authority over "expansion of
private water and sewer lines from any existing provider of
,17
services." Other elements of the system included exclusive
agricultural zoning, user fees, a capital programming process,
15Robert Edwards, "Prince George's County:Staging Growth," Ibid.,
Vol. 3, p. 274.
1 6 Einsweiler et. al., op. cit., p. 316.
17 Ibid., p. 327.
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controls relating to off-site facilities, and preferential
taxation. The key to the success of the program was the
consensus among officials of Salem, its county government and
neighboring jurisdictions that growth management was a legiti-
mate regional objective. This fostered the necessary
intergovernmental cooperation to make the program work.
CRITERIA FOR A SUCCESSFUL GROWTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WHICH
INCORPORATES WATER SERVICE POLICY
The experience of several municipalities has demon-
strated that water service policy can serve as an effective
element in a growth management system. However, it is not
sufficient for a municipality to believe it can simply direct
growth by ordering its water utility to supply or deny ser-
vice. Careful study of these cases, related court tests,
and the planning literature imply that several conditions are
necessary for establishment of a growth-related water service
policy. The following six criteria for effective use of
water service in a growth management system need to be care-
fully considered.
Geographical Congruence
"The capacity to execute or institute a system of growth
management is dependent, in part, upon the coincidence between
the area of growth and the area of governance." 18 All of the
communities described above were able to use utility service
1Einsweiller , e t . al. , op. cit., p . 327 .
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as a tool in directing growth in a certain geographical area
because they had gained control over the utility extension
and service decision-making process. Particularly instruc-
tive is the case of Salem, Oregon. As a result of intergovern-
mental agreements with surrounding county governments, Salem,
which operated a water utility, was declared to be the prime
source of water service even beyond its city limits. The
Boundary Commission, composed of both county and city repre-
sentatives, was able to utilize this clear policy statement
as a reason for controlling the establishment of private
water companies and districts outside of Salem's borders.
This has forced developers to be dependent upon the municipal
utility and has put some teeth into the effectiveness of the
city-county development plan tied to a utility extension
policy.
In contrast to the Salem example is that of Boulder,
Colorado. A joint city-county comprehensive plan had been
prepared and on the basis of a growth limiting policy state-
ment, the City of Boulder denied extension of its municipal
water service to a developer outside of Boulder's city limits
but within the utility's non-Boulder service area. In
Robinson v. Boulder, in which the developer sued for pro-
vision of service, the court found for the developer. "The
court observed in this connection that the County Commis-
sioners, not the City of Boulder, had jurisdiction over the
1 9 Robinson v. Boulder, 547 P 2d 228 (1976)
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decisions concerning conformity of the development with the
comprehensive plan, a fact which may sharply distinguish
Robinson from cases where both land use and utility are within
the jurisdiction of a single agency." 20
"Intergovernmental agreements often are required both
in carrying out annexation policies and in defining urban
service districts. This is true both because the land area
necessary for a rational facilities plan often crosses juris-
dictional boundaries, and because a variety of special dis-
tricts is involved. If local governments are committed to the
use of capital facilities for managing development, they must
obviously retain a measure of control of these facilities.
Where alternatives exist outside of the control of the munici-
pality, facilities cannot be as important a factor in direct-
ing development." 21
The above suggests that for reasons of both effective-
ness and legal validity, one of the minimum conditions in the
use of water service policy as a growth management tool is
some form of recognized jurisdictional authority coincident
between the utility service area and the area for which
growth management plans are directed. "Unfortunately, in
most localities the government that controls the use of land
may not control financing and construction of supportive
public services such as water. Until such facilities are
2 0 ASPO, op. cit., p. 61.
2 1 ASPO, op. cit., p. 23.
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publicly committed by agreement with appropriate governing
bodies, the deferring of development rights is not reasonable."22
Establishment of a Regional Plan
Common sense would suggest that if utility service were
to be used as an element in growth management, a necessary
precondition is the existence of a plan specifying and justi-
fying community's growth management objectives. Utility
engineers and managers correctly point out that they shouldn't
be unilaterally shaping a community's value system. Joe
Kuranz, Manager of the Waukesha (Wis.) Water Utility, states
"You can't say categorically that it's right or wrong to use
water as a tool to guide growth. We need some good plan-
ning ... some good land-use planning and some objectives for
developers. Then we can tell the utilities what demands they
will be expected to meet."
Capital improvement plans (CIP) are not new to municipal
and utility planners. Historically, the CIP has been viewed
'as a valuable means of improving a community's financial
management and scheduling." " "Capital improvement plans have
normally been technical documents and have little to do with
planning," 25 is an extreme but not all that uncommon percep-
tion among public works engineers.
22 Herbert Franklin, op. cit., p. 95.
23 William Forestell, op. cit., p. 458.
24 ASPO, op. cit., p. 2.
25 Ibid., p. 17.
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This view is changing rapidly. As reported in a recent
survey on this topic, "As communities have gained a better
understanding of the relationships between their capital
facilities decisions, their development patterns, and their
costs, the potential power of the CIP to serve as a technique
to implement planning policy has become a matter of increas-
ing interest. Evidence that decisions about capital facili-
ties are being more closely linked to land use and development
policies is beginning to be reflected in a number of CIPs,
26
procedures manuals, and community studies."
2 7
Case studies of this issue validate the point. As
examples are the following:
Richmond, Virginia and Montgomery County, Maryland
"Although Richmond and Montgomery County present
their capital improvements programs as documents
separate from their plans, the format in which
they are presented strongly emphasizes the con-
nection between the CIP and the plan."
San Luis Obispo, California
"San Luis Obispo states its capital facilities
policies within its plan. Growth management
as a community goal has provided a strong
impetus for linking the capital improvements
plan to the plan."
Ann Arbor, Michigan
"Ann Arbor's Capital Improvement Budget and Pro-
gram for 1977-78 though presented separately
from the comprehensive plan, relies heavily on
the city's General Development Plan and Area
Development Plans."
-20-
2 6 Ibid., p. 3.
2 7 Ibid., p. 14-16.
Daniel Mandelker has pointed out that "A comprehensive
plan reflects a collective judgement about the allocation
of development opportunities throughout the community ...
Referring to what is known as the consistency requirement,
he advocates the use of a comprehensive plan to tie together
all the elements of a regional growth plan to insure internal
logic among its parts. "Comprehensive planning is necessary
because of the careful orchestration of community regulatory
and public service programs that growth management requires.
Both zoning and subdivision control ordinances may be employed
in a managed growth program, and these in turn will be linked
to community capital facility programming. An adequate plan-
ning base is needed if these various programs and regulatory
ordinances are to be administered cohesively in furtherance
,9
of common policy objectives."
The consistency requirement for comprehensive plans not
only fosters a more efficient growth management system but a
more equitable and predictable system as well. Private land-
owners and developers often complain about the tyranny of
inconsistency on the part of local government. Substantial
sums of money are invested in development projects before
governmental approval is sought. It is clearly in the inter-
est of public officials to provide the development community
unequivocal, prompt, consistent responses to questions of
development approval. Not to do so increases development
28 Daniel Mandelker, "The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan,"
Management and Control of Growth, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 28.
29 Ibid., p. 25
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and housing costs to the consumer and makes for inefficient
use of capital. As Mandelker notes, "In the absence of a
local comprehensive plan, zoning and rezoning actions by
local governments may be ad hoc and arbitrary. It is princi-
pally this concern that has moved courts to accord a greater
role to the comprehensive plan as a check on local zoning
administration." 30
Legal necessity appears to dictate the need for a com-
prehensive plan in order for utility service policy to be a
tool in effective growth management. "The existence of a CIP
is considered to be one of the reasons for the court's uphold-
ing of the widely-cited development management of Ramapo."
Fred Bosselman, another observer on the same case, noted, "The
court now holds that when a community has a sound plan for the
development of its entire jurisdiction, it can preclude devel-
opment inconsistent with that plan in outlying areas."3 He
also stated that "to the extent that municipalities are
required to follow their own zoning ordinance, the construc-
tion of capital facilities must be consistent with the com-
,33
prehensive plans in these jurisdictions." Finally, as a
Maryland court noted in the Smoke Rise v. Washington Suburban
Sanitary Commission case, "It is well established that devel-
opment demand may properly be impeded where growth
30 Ibid., p. 30.
31Ibid., p. 16.
3 2 Fred Bosselman, "Town of Ramapo:Binding the World,"
Management and Control of Growth, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 104.
3 3 ASPO, op. cit., p. 61
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restrictions are imposed pursuant to well-reasoned, compre-
hensive plans for the improvement of the region."
The notion here is that the courts see the capital im-
provement plan as embodiment of the policies expressed in a
comprehensive plan. Furthermore, the CIP represents the good
faith effort of a community to provide physical facilities
to accommodate community growth consistent with the objec-
tives stated in the overall community plan. This is a neces-
sary legal requirement in order for the courts to avoid the
conclusion that a community's actions are either arbitrary or
unconstitutionally exclusionary (about which more is discussed
in the next section). "In the absence of a publicly adopted
plan for the specific commitment of resources for sewers,
water treatment plants, roads, and schools in a definite
period of time, policies to slow or stop urban growth can only
be exclusionary in motivation or effect." as
The desirability of having not only a plan but having it
regional in nature is becoming increasingly apparent. Several
observers are critical of the Ramapo plan because it tends to
perpetuate the single family home characteristic of its
neighborhoods and push problems such as the legitimate need
for higher density housing upon its neighbors. Herbert
Franklin sums up this view well by stating, "Ramapo's
34 Smoke Rise v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 400 F.
Supp. 1369, 1384 (D.C. Md. 1975).
3 5 Herbert Franklin, op. cit., p. 95.
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controlled growth policy, if administered reasonably, will
produce only marginal improvements in the environment for
the relatively few who can afford to live there, by assur-
ing that community facilities will be in place when they
move in. From the standpoint of the urban region, however,
it will assure the continued sprawl of housing across the
landscape and the excessive transportation, sewer, and other
environmental costs that flow from this pattern of develop-
ment. Ramapo will also, in effect, deprive most of the
households in the region from any opportunity to reside with-
in its boundaries."
While the courts have not yet required regional values
to be explicitly weighed in a community's growth management
plan, they are hinting at it. As Fred Bosselman states,
"Berenson v. Town of New Castle (another New York Appeals
Court decision subsequent to Ramapo) suggests that the court
may now subject municipal land use policies to a more rigor-
ous regional impact test than was the case in Ramapo.""
He predicts the possibility that neighboring communities each
seeking to establish their own growth management policies at
the expense of each other might be extremely myopic. "So it
may be that the tide of capital improvement programming to
deliberately influence growth will carry with it an outcome
3 6 Ibid., p. 98.
3 7 ASPO, op. cit., p. 64.
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that most municipal decision-makers would dislike: the state
as referee between municipality and landowner and, indeed
among communities. "
Exclusionary Tests
The act of denying utility service to a given parcel of
land, either indefinitely or for a specified period of time,
is an intentional act to discriminate against that parcel of
land in favor of some other land. Furthermore, it is an act
of discrimination against the ultimate users of that land,
whether they be homeowners, renters, or businessmen. The
question that arises from constitutional law is whether that
act of discrimination is not "undue discrimination which leads
to unconstitutionally exclusionary outcomes."
In a monograph on this topic, Herbert Franklin suggests
that "three legal principles can be applied to anti-growth
policies in a locality to test potentially exclusionary
aspects. Under these principles, the exercise by a locality
of its power to regulate the use of land within its jurisdic-
tion may be invalid (1) if it does not sufficiently serve the
interests of people of the state as a whole; (2) if in effect
it singles out a racial minority and denies them housing oppor-
tunities; or (3) if it limits the freedom of citizens to
migrate and settle in areas of their choice. Lawyers often
-25-
3 8 ibid., p. 70.
3 9 Ibid., p. 55.
refer to these as due process/general welfare, equal protec-
tion and right to travel principles."
These issues were discussed at length in the Ramapo case
majority opinion. "There is, then, something inherently sus-
pect in a scheme which, apart from its professed purposes,
effects a restriction upon the free mobility of a people
until sometime in the future when projected facilities are
available to meet increased demands. Under its guise (zoning)
townships have been wont to try their hand at an array of
exclusionary devices in the hope of avoiding the very burden
which growth must inevitably bring. What we will not coun-
tenance is community efforts at immunization or exclusion."
The court concluded that Ramapo's plan was not exclu-
sionary. "Far from being exclusionary, the present amend-
ments merely seek, by the implementation of sequential
development and timed growth, to provide a balanced, cohesive
community dedicated to the efficient utilization of land. We
only require that communities confront the challenge of
population growth with open doors."
In many of these cases, the courts are trying to
establish the equities of each situation. The quest for
efficient utilization of land and community facilities in a
growing community reflects the attempt to balance the rights
40 Herbert Franklin, oo. cit., p. 88.
4 1 Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, op cit.
42 Ibid.
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of several parties. The existing residents of a community are
often interested in preserving its character and avoiding
growth-induced tax burdens. They argue their rights in the
form of the general welfare of their community. Landowners
and developers are interested in maintaining the viability of
their private property rights and perceive infringements,
often even with compensation, as inequitable treatment of
these rights. Finally, future residents have certain rights
of travel and mobility. Direct and indirect burdens upon
these rights (such as growth plans which require the costs of
new community facilities to be totally borne by the new resi-
dents) are viewed as inequitable by these residents. Any
growth management system must seek not only efficient solu-
tions to community problems, but equitable solutions as well.
Water Service Policy as an Element in Growth Management Systems
Robert Einsweiler, a leading researcher in the field of
growth management systems, points out that "the term system
is used advisedly. It includes all the development control-
ling, guiding, or influencing elements employed by the public
sector. Normally, all elements have not been conceived as
an integrated system, but they do act concurrently on a given
development decision and should therefore be viewed as a
system. The lack of integration among the elements should be
seen as a problem in system efficiency rather than a question
of whether or not a system exists. The need is for a system-
atic view of development controls." 4
4 3 Einsweiler et. al., op. cit., p. 284.
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Case studies bear out the conclusion that the more suc-
cessful growth management plans utilize facilities develop-
ment as one element of an overall strategy. "A number of
communities are beginning to link these devices with each
other ... Such systems are designed in an attempt to make the
community's regulations, ordinances and fiscal policies con-
sistent and mutually supportive. For example, in communities
attempting to follow a systematic approach, the intention of
the specific location and phasing of water and sewer lines
can be supported by a zoning ordinance that regulates density
of development in the affected area ... " It is further
reported that "integrated land management systems that co-
ordinate all or some of these devices--capital improvement
programs, zoning and subdivision ordinances, service dis-
tricts, land acquisition, negotiation, and formal and informal
pricing policies--are attracting the interest of a number
of municipalities. Planning practice is shifting to include
a wider range of processes and techniques than it once
depended upon."
Growth Management and Political Accountability
The notion of the inviolability of the property right is
deeply held in American culture. As Professor George Cabot
Lodge has discussed, this stems from the Lockean tradition
that a society which guarded property rights cherished indi-
46
vidual freedoms as well. In a sense, property rights have
44 ASPO, p_. cit., p. 32.
45 Ibid., p. 32.
46 George Cabot Lodge, The New American Ideology, Knopf Co., N.Y. 1976.
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served as an ideological proxy for generally accepted rights
of individuals within our society.
Governmental actions which serve to infringe upon the
exercise of privately held property rights have been viewed
with circumspection by the judiciary. However, from the
earliest zoning cases, such as Euclid v. Ambler Co., there
have been established principles of general welfare which in
certain situations supercede the rights of an individual to
do with his land as he pleases. In the United States, a
precondition of such governmental intrusion into the private
market system is a legislative finding by a governmental
entity with the authority to wield police powers that such a
restriction on individual rights is necessary in order to
meet a more desirable general and public welfare objective.
It is small wonder that the courts have been reluctant
to insert themselves in the process of arbitrating these
issues. The questions of land use are directly tied to some
of the most fundamental values in our society and generate
considerable passion (and bile). While these controversies
are normally postured upon the economic interests of develop-
ers versus citizen perception of the quality of his life-
style, they really touch a deeper nerve. Public land use
boils down to the authority we wish to invest in institu-
tions of representative government to circumscribe landed
property rights on behalf of legitimate community interests;
in short, to our trust of public ends.
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On such a sensitive subject as using capital facilities
to affect an individual's right to the use of his property,
the institution that hazards such action must be perceived
within the community as having the legitimate right to do so.
This perception of legitimacy is both legally and intuitively
tied to our notion of local government being most account-
able to the community at large. When regulatory decisions
are being made, a postulate of such actions seems to be that
those who make them must be accountable to public investiture
and recall. The government that delegates such regulatory
policy making to subunits too far removed from direct pro-
cesses of representative government runs the grave risk that
regulatory decisions aren't perceived as legitimate and those
who make them unaccountable.
It is true that the courts have a post hoc role regard-
ing the constitutionality of land use decisions. "But in the
long run, it is the legislators who must get about the busi-
ness of realigning some of the decision-making power and
redefining the criteria by which the public regulation of
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land use is to be measured." In practical terms, this means
that public water utilities that have been delegated the
right to use water service policy as an instrument of a com-
munity growth management plan should be directly accountable
to the government making the delegation. If not, it must in
4 7 Richard Babcock and Fred Bosselman, "Land Use Controls:
History and Legal Status", Management and Control of Growth, op. cit.,
Vol. 1, p. 207.
-30-
some other way be viewed as an entity with sufficient politi-
cal legitimacy to responsibly and equitably establish such
policies. In short, the utility's "legislative" authority in
situations must be well established and accepted within the
community.
The Role of Utility Law
Before approaching the fundamental question of using
municipal water service for non-utility purposes, a prelimin-
ary legal issue as to the applicability of general utility
law to municipally owned utilities must be resolved. Bab-
cock and others "support the view of most authorities that
basic utility law is equally applicable to both private and
municipally owned utilities."4" This issue is important
because utility law generally obligates a utility to provide
service to all customers within its service area unless the
utility has reasonable grounds not to do so. Such reasonable
grounds may include unprofitability and temporary shortages
of supply. The case law is very recent, small, and incon-
clusive on the question of whether a municipality is governed
by general utility law and how far it may push the concept of
reasonable grounds for denial of service.
Restated, this question is whether or not a municipality
can deny or delay utility availability for purposes not
related to the functioning of that utility. Many commentators
believe that utility law does not allow utility service to be
4 8 ASPO, p_ cit., p. 53.
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conditioned upon community objectives apart from the engineer-
ing, technical and fiscal imperatives of a utility system.
Others assert just the opposite. Barbara Ramsey, in a mono-
graph of this subject, concludes "local government has broad
power to refuse to extend utility service to certain areas
within its jurisdiction. The magnitude and significance of
this power has not been fully appreciated. It is an impor-
tant tool for controlling the location and timing of develop-
ment in a rational, coherent, and efficient fashion."
In the previously mentioned Robinson v. Boulder case a
Colorado judge found "that the City has a legal obligation
to provide the plaintiffs with water and sewer services under
two theories of law. First, the City is a public utility
insofar as supplying water and sewer services ... is con-
cerned. Second, the City may not discriminate between pro-
spective users of water and sewer services where it has
established an area of service and has 'become the exclusive
supplier of services in that area."5 0 Thus, the City of
Boulder was required to supply water services to a parcel of
land outside its city boundary but within its contracted
service area even though to do so was inconsistent with its
growth management plan.
Other courts have reached opposite conclusions. "As far
as the federal courts are concerned, California cities may
4 9 Barbara Ramsey, op. cit., p. 448.
5 0 Robinson v. Boulder, oD. cit.
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refuse to provide utilities and then deny a permit on the
basis of inadequate facilities." 5 1 As previously mentioned
in the Smoke Rise case, a Maryland Court upheld the right
for municipal utilities to deny service for non-utility
related reasons.
One approach to remedy any question as to a publicly-
owned utility's legal ability to operate its system while
being mindful of community growth management objectives is
to establish such a role in a specific grant of legislative
authority from state government. Since it is state govern-
ment that creates general public utility law in the first
place, it would seem reasonable that the state could estab-
lish or permit exemptions from normal utility law requirement
for municipally-owned utilities.
"However indistinct the legal road signs may be, however
obscure the trail between the interests of each municipality
and of the region, it can be expected that the use of capital
improvements to direct municipal growth will proliferate in
those areas where pressures are apparent."
5 1 ASPO, oD. cit., p. 65.
5 2 Smoke Rise v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, op. cic.
5 3 ASPO, op. cit., p. 67
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CHAPTER SUMMARY
Evidence from communities which have successfully imple-
mented growth management policies indicates provision of
water service can be an element of such systems under certain
circumstances. Six criteria or prerequisites are developed
for water service policy to be a viable planning tool.
Briefly, these criteria require the following:
1) geographical congruence between the water
service agency's jurisdiction and the growth
management area,
2) availability of a well-defined, enforceable
regional growth management plan,
3) water service policy be only one element
of a growth management system,
4) water service policy not be implemented in
such a way as to promote constitutionally
exclusionary outcomes,
5) the water service agency to have sufficient
political accountability so as not to call
into question the legitimacy of its authority,
and
6) the utility law of the state in question to
permit the water service agency to consider
non-utility purposes in its decision-making.
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CHAPTER 2
A CASE HISTORY OF THE DENVER WATER BOARD AND GROWTH
IN THE DENVER METRO AREA
This chapter probes the history of the Denver Water Board
(DWB) over the last 30 years that relates to the question of
the effect of the DWB on the growth of the Denver metro area.
Evidence is examined to address the issue of whether the DWB
could and should have played a role in curbing aggregate
growth in the Denver area or substantially affecting the
spatial distribution of this growth. In particular, the
criteria developed in the previous chapter for effective util-
ity involvement in growth management are applied to the DWB
water supply system.
Due to the foresight of its early management and the
financial resources of the City of Denver the DWB, a Charter
agency of the City of Denver, by 1950 had acquired substan-
tial water rights both near Denver and also high in the
Rockies on the other side of the Continental Divide, the
Western Slope. The Denver Water Board was for the better part
of the first half of this century the dominant supplier of
water to the metro Denver population. In 1950, the DWB
served not only all the people of Denver but also most of the
people living in the towns surrounding postwar Denver, in total
over 85% of the entire metro population.
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By entering into service contracts with suburban dis-
tributors for provision of treated water, the DWB acted as a
de facto metropolitan water agency. It was not, however,
considered to be a water utility subject to the control of
the Colorado Public Utilities Commission when selling water
outside the boundaries of the City of Denver.' The DWB
retained its rights as a highly independent agency governed
solely by a five-member board appointed by the Mayor of
Denver.
At the end of 1979, the DWB was a much larger entity than
it had been 30 years earlier. Its safe annual water yield had
increased by 100% to over 300,000 acre-feet of water. Its
number of taps served had increased by 213%. It was the
largest water supply agency in the Denver metro area with six
times the number of taps than Aurora, the second largest
municipal water supply agency in the Denver area, services.
Yet, interestingly enough, in 1979 the DWB share of the
urban water customers had dropped to about 55%. Unlike the
early 1950's, several independent municipal water systems now
exist with substantial water supply, storage, and treatment
facilities. The creation of many of these systems is rooted
in the history of the Blue Line of the '50's, DWB's first
policy of restricting its water service area.
'Englewood v. Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 229 P2d. 667 (1951)
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HISTORY OF DWB SERVICE AREA RESTRICTIONS
One role for a utility in growth management is to use
the expansion or limitation of its service area as either
an inducement or prophylactic to growth. The DWB has had
two extended periods in its history when it limited expansion
of its water service area boundaries. Both cases were the
product of utility planning considerations and not as a
result of conscious growth management intentions. Nonetheless,
it is instructive to examine the history of the DWB service
area restrictions to determine what, if any, impact they had
upon metro growth.
1951 Blue Line
The DWB found itself in difficult circumstances in the
early 1950's. Though it had acquired senior water rights on
the Western Slope in the 1920's, it had not developed all
these rights and effectively utilized them in the DWB system.
At the same time, Denver was experiencing the initial phase
of what turned out to be a prolonged drought. It was caught
in a period with undeveloped reserve supplies of water and
much lower than normal supplies in its existing reservoirs..
Because of its Charter requirements that the DWB provide
a reliable supply of water to the residents of Denver as its
first priority and because to do this the DWB couldn't meet
future extra-Denver needs, the DWB established a prohibition
on expansion of its service area boundaries. Water Board
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planners drew a blue line on a map around its existing metro
service area and refused to consider extension of distributor
contracts beyond these boundaries. The Blue Line encompassed
much of the then suburban population including Aurora,
Englewood, Lakewood, Arvada, and numerous water special dis-
tricts in unincorporated areas. The Blue Line policy lasted
nine years, until 1960.
The reaction of neighboring communities was a mixture of
embitterment and determination to seek independence from the
DWB. "The drawing of the Blue Line by Denver ... forced the
development of independent and sometimes marginal new water
systems outside its limits. This step accelerated and accen-
tuated the fragmentation of the metropolitan area with many
small water systems which ultimately formed the basis for a
number of small governments."2  As stated by another researcher,
"During the 1950's, urbanization occurred in many unincorpo-
rated areas. The DWB extended service to any special dis-
trict within reach of its borders. However, when Denver began
to experience a water shortage, it limited the extent of its
extraterritorial service. Many special districts were no
longer able to secure water from Denver, and, as a consequence,
they turned to other municipalities for service. New demands
placed upon municipalities prompted the expansion of municipal
2 Denver Water Board, Metropolitan Water Requirements and Resources,
1975-2010, Colorado State Legislature, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 10.
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water supply programs.', The following represent some
examples.
Aurora - This fast growing eastern neighbor of Denver,
while relying upon the DWB had its share of complaints;
among them the higher charges it paid for water and the
fact that Denver offered Aurora only annual water service
contracts without guaranteeing long term supply. "Rela-
tions between Denver and Aurora began to deteriorate in
the early 1950's. Much of the City of Aurora (which was
land -yet to be developed) was beyond this Blue Line, and
consequently these areas could not in the future be pro-
vided with water purchased from Denver. Officials of the
DWB and Aurora met several times in an attempt to resolve
the problems which had resulted from Denver's water ser-
vice extension policy (the Blue Line). Statements made
during these meetings resulted in severe hostility between
the two governments and precipitated a complete breakdown
of negotiations on questions of water policy. Aurora
began planning the development of a water supply system
which would be independent of Denver." 4 Aurora now has
such a system. First, by developing wells and surface
rights on the South Platte River, Aurora in 1956 began
supplying residents beyond the Blue Line. In the mid-
1960's it completed a joint project, Phase I of the
3 James Cox, Metropolitan Water Supply:The Denver Experience, Bureau
of Governmental Research and Service, Univ. of Colorado, 1967, p. 148.
4 Ibid. p. 124.
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Homestake Water Project, with the City of Colorado Springs
to import water from the Western Slope. "It has been
estimated that the Homestake project is capable of pro-
viding water supply to guarantee Aurora an adequate
water supply until 1985."
Littleton - Littleton had its own well water system in
place before the Blue Line and itself was not dependent
upon the DWB. "Littleton experienced a very rapid pop-
ulation growth in the 1950's. During that period, the
municipal water supply system was not expanded suffi-
ciently to keep pace with the growth. Also, because of
the Blue Line many unincorporated areas near Littleton
requested the City to provide them with water service.
By 1960, it was apparent that Littleton's water supply
sources were wholly inadequate to meet future needs." 6
After several years of considering options for expanding
its own system, Littleton in 1968 reached agreement with
the DWB to have it take over its system. The Blue Line
did not stop or slow growth in the vicinity of Littleton,
but rather drove non-DWB served special districts to
another supplier. The consequences of this were acceler-
ation of demand on that City's water supply system to
the point that it became inadequate ata time well be-
fore it otherwise would have.
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5 Ibid. p. 126.
6Ibid. p. 134.
Westminster - "Like other municipalities in the metro-
politan area, the expansion of Westminster's water
supply system was unable to keep pace with the increase
in demands which resulted from population growth during
the 1950's. Between 1950 and 1960, the population of
Westminster increased from 1,686 to 13,850, a growth of
7
over 700%." Westminster approached the DWB, "during the
mid-1950's when Westminster's water supply was no longer
adequate, in order to secure water from the central city.
However, it was informed that it was beyond Denver's
8
Blue Line." After several years of rationing and near
crisis within, the City of Westminster made the decision
to invest in its own water supply system which was com-
pleted in 1964.
Other Districts - As reported in a Colorado Legislature
report on the metro water needs, other entities were also
influenced to invest in water supply works. "As a result
of this restriction (the Blue Line), Englewood severed
connections with Denver and developed a separate system.
Other entities including Consolidated Mutual, Crestview
Water and Sanitation District, Arvada, Northwest Util-
ities (now Thornton, Western Hills, and Northglenn), South
Adams County and Broomfield developed and expanded inde-
pendent water supplies to allow land development growth."
7 Ibid. p. 143.
8 Ibid. p. 142.
9Llewelyn-Davies Carson Ltd., Relationship of Water Supply and
Urban Growth in the Denver Region, Prepared for Army Corps of Engineers,
Missouri River Division, August, 1978, p. 71.
-41-
Aggregate metro population growth during the Blue Line
decade of the '50's was hardly inhibited. The Denver region
grew by 309,000 people or about 50%.1" Denver itself grew by
78,000 people or a rate of 18% while suburban areas grew at
fantastic rates. Aurora, for example, increased its popula-
tion from 11,420 in 1950 to 48,550 by 1960, a 325% increase.
In contrast the decade of the 1960's, without a Blue Line,
saw a slower growth rate. The metro area population increased
by 298,000 people or about 32%.
"Housing supply appears to show no significant effects
from the Blue Line period. Increases in supply during the
fifties are not dissimilar to the rate of increase during the
sixties. Multifamily housing increased over the years but in
no greater proportion than single family."1 2
"Overall, the Blue Line and water supply restrictions
appear to have had very little influence on either con-
straining growth in the Denver Region or promoting higher
densities within the area."' 3
The DWB, while a dominant factor in the metro water
market, was by no means the supplier of last resort. It had
no monopoly upon water supplies. Suburban communities with
10Unless otherwise noted population figures are from the Demographic
Section, Colorado Dept. of Local Affairs.
"Llewelyn-Davies Carson Ltd., Relationship of Water Supply and
Urban Growth in the Denver Region, Prepared for Army Corps of Engineers,
Missouri River Division, August, 1978, p. 40.
12 Ibid. p. 41.
131bid. p. 41.
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sufficient amenities and land to attract growth devised
methods to supply themselves with water even to the extent
of adopting a variety of shortsighted solutions which would
cost them more later.
1970's Policy of limited Service Area Amendments
A quarter century later, the DWB found itself in some-
what similar circumstances to those of the 1950's. While it
had virtually doubled its raw water capacity with the com-
pletion of the Dillon Reservoir and Roberts Tunnel system,
it still had problems. This new supply had carried Denver
for the last fifteen years and would only last to the end of
the '80's. Due to the enormously long lead times necessary
to bring on additional development of Western Slope rights,
the DWB began to worry about the problems in financing a
huge new raw water collection project. This was particularly
true given the problems the DWB had in gaining Denver voter
approval of a general obligation bond issue for new collection
and treatment projects. Turned down earlier, the DWB succeeded
in 1973 only after offering Denver voters a scaled down project.
The DWB was also concerned about its facilities for
treatment capacity. It had reached the point during the hot
summer months when there were several days when treatment
capacity of the current system was strained. In order to
meet the needs for long term treatment capacity, the DWB had
tried to begin construction of a large new facility, the
Foothills Water Treatment Plant.
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This project was mired in controversy. Because a por-
tion of the construction access road crossed federal property,
a Corps of Engineers Section 404 dredge and fill permit was
required. This triggered federal environmental impact
statement requirements. Several environmental groups and the
EPA challenged the EIS on the basis of inadequate attention
to alternatives and inadequate investigation of impacts of
the treatment plant on metro growth. A citizen law suit was
brewing and the DWB recognized the uncertainty that the new
plant would be on line in 1977 as scheduled.
Though not widely publicized, the DWB adopted an informal
policy of deferring water service area additions in early 1973.
This policy lasted until late 1974, during which time few
requests for extension had been acted upon. In late 1974,
the DWB sent a letter to its distributors mentioning the
slow down in extensions of water service areas. It said that
in the coming months the DWB would be considering logical
additions to areas that it would agree to serve in its dis-
tributor territories. In late 1974 and early 1975, the DWB
acted upon a small portion of these proposed additions. The
chart below indicates the degree to which this policy reduced
acreage added to the system of non-Denver distributors:
Area Outside of Denver Amended into
DWB Service Area
Date Acreage
1970 7667
1971 6509
1972 2100
1973 63
1974 353
1975 833
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Additions between 1975 and 1978 have been negligible in
contrast to the thousands of acres annually added before this
policy.
In January 1979, the DWB instructed its staff to develop
a formal policy for dealing with distributor requests that
had been piling up to amend service area boundaries. In
June 1979, the DWB staff recommended the following policy
which was adopted by the DWB:
1. Amended areas must be adjacent to existing service
areas.
2. Amended areas must be serviceable by existing DWB
facilities or within a reasonable distance from
facilities.
3. Tap allocations would not be increased as a result
of the amendment.
4. Amendments would not be permitted to allow service
to any area receiving water service from another
supplier.
5. No new distributors would be accepted.
6. The DWB would not approve extensions of service
areas which would involve furnishing a greater
amount of water outside Denver than it can reason-
ably anticipate would be available for the entire
supply for which the Board had accepted responsi-
bility.
4 Item C-1, DWB meeting, 6/8/79
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The DWB staff, after examining the growth potential of
its distributors, estimated that about 4500 acres of land of
prime development potential would be requested for amendment
to the existing service area within five years and most of
that in the first year or two. Beyond this, the staff esti-
mated an additional 5000 acres of land could have long range
development potential and would likely be included in dis-
tributor requests to the DWB for service area additions by
1990.
The first amendment acted upon in the summer of 1979
was the addition of 400 plus acres to allow development of
the Ken Caryl housing development west of the Hogback, a land
development project associated with the location of the Johns-
Manville Corporation's World Headquarters, in an area adjacent
to an existing DWB distributor. Apparently the DWB agreed to
the argument of the Denver Planning Office that such an addi-
tion was part of an informal agreement which helped persuade
the company relocate to Denver.
A year later the DWB staff presented the DWB with requests
for an additional 615 acres which met the above guidelines.
In the summer of 1980 the DWB approved these additions.
Within the year after it modified its policy on service area
additions, the DWB had added about 1000 acres including the
Ken Caryl parcel to its total service area responsibility.
"sPersonal interview with Bob Jensen, Director of Administration,
Denver Water Board, July, 1980.
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While this represents a significant amount of new land, it is
a far smaller amount of land the DWB itself had expected
requests for and far smaller than the several thousand acres
per year added in the '60's and early '70's.
The impact upon aggregate metro growth over the 1973-79
period when the DWB significantly slowed extension of its
service area boundaries is difficult to establish conclusively.
The number of taps on the DWB system grew 12% over this
period." The four county metro area's population was esti-
mated to have grown by 9%. Looking at solely these figures
one might conclude that the DWB system was capturing a larger
share of metro growth and thus encouraging shifts of growth
to its service area. More detailed analysis of individual
county data indicates a possible problem in this conclusion.
Over this period, Denver itself is estimated to have
declined in population by 11% which is significant for the
DWB since about 60% of its customer base is in Denver. Adams
County, relatively little of which is served by the DWB is
estimated to have grown by 12%. Arapahoe County which
includes Aurora's and Englewood's independent systems grew
at an estimated rate of 32%. Aurora's number of water taps
grew 77% over this period and its population 48%. Englewood,
relatively well developed itself and with water supply esti-
mated to be almost twice its current demand, has agreed to
" Denver Water Board 1978 Annual Report, p. 57.
17 Metropolitan Water Requirements and Resources, OD. cit., Vol. 2,
p. 103.
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sell water to the new Mission Viejo project. This proposed
inew city" with an estimated fully build population approach-
ing 90,000 is being developed on land in Douglas County out-
side the DWB service area and the Denver Regional Council of
Governments regional urban service area. Mission Viejo
approached the DWB for service but was refused on the basis
that it was outside the DWB boundaries and the DWB was not
considering additions to its service area. Jefferson County
whose non-mountainous population is largely served by the
DWB, with the exception of Golden, grew an estimated 27%.
In summary, the data indicates th'at the region as a
whole grew at a slightly faster rate than national population
growth. Its core city, Denver, declined in population due to
changes in family composition, some racial composition shifts
due to court ordered school busing, and employment center
growth outside of Denver. The suburban counties of Arapahoe
and Jefferson grew at rates several times the national aver-
age with one of these suburban communities, Aurora, being
listed as the fastest growing of its size within the nation.
Future growth beyond the DWB service area seem uninhibited as
evidenced by the approval by the Douglas County Commissioners
for a major new town, Mission Viejo, being built of Denver
metro's urban fringe.
A realistic appraisal of this data leads on to the con-
clusion that the DWB informal hold on service area extensions
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during the 1973-79 period had little dampening impact upon
metro population growth. This is, in part, due to the fact
that there exists quite a bit of developable land yet within
the DWB service area. But it is also true that non-DWB sup-
pliers had the capacity to add new customers to their systems
at a rapid rate.
DENVER WATER BOARD TAP ALLOCATION PROGRAM
One reason the DWB relaxed its limitation on water
service amendments in 1979 was the successful establishment
in 1977 of a water tap allocation program. The DWB Manager
stated, "The tap allocation program has been shown to be a
very adequate and responsive tool for controlling expansion
of the Denver water system. It is suggested the Board de-
emphasize service area boundaries as a means of controlling
such expansion and rely upon tap allocation programs when
necessary. The benefits of such a policy would include:
1. Distributors would have the means to resolve local
problems.
2. Local determinations could govern where growth
would occur.
3. Artificial property values, based upon eligibility
for water service as opposed to where facilities
were located, would not be created.
4. Land use planning, unconstrained by current service
area boundaries, would be possible.
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5. The Board would not be accused of controlling or
directing where growth could occur as a consequence
of its service area policy.
6. Better utilization of existing systems and econom-
ics in system expansion could be achieved." 18
The DWB was concerned that it had unintentionally gotten
drawn into the business of growth management even though its
motivation had been utility related. The above restates the
long held position of the DWB that it should not be seen as
an instrument of land use planning. In the '50's the DWB
had no alternative to service area boundaries to restrain the
demand upon its system. In the '70's it realized that its
tap allocation program could be used as an effective tool in
curbing demand upon its water supplies without itself being
involved in "side issues" such as land use and development
patterns. The following describes the tap allocation program
and analyzes what if any effect it had upon the spatial dis-
tribution of growth in the metro area.
History
In the spring of 1977, DWB officials had new worries.
That winter's snowfall had been one of the lightest in years
and it was clear the state was gripped by drought. The
major mountain reservoirs would be only 30-50% full after the
snowpack run-off. Raw water reserves clearly were going to
be at a premium.
18 Denver Water Board Meeting Item C-1, June 8, 1979.
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Another headache to the DWB was the continuing litiga-
tion over its proposed 150 million gallon per day Foothills
treatment plant. While it had been planned for operation by
this time, delay in the granting of necessary permits, because
of environmental controversy, made it clear the plant wouldn't
be in operation until the early 1980's. This caused problems
in the dry Denver summers since peak treated water needs had
exceeded existing treated water plant capacity on several
occasions. It was apparent that the DWB service area was in
for several more summers of days when water pressure would be
low because of excess demand upon the system.
The DWB decided to act. First, it established stringent
outdoor watering limitations. All of its customers were
limited in their outdoor irrigation to three hours per day
once every three days. Second, the Board established its
first-ever tap allocation program.
Operation
"The water tap allocation program began in June 1977.
At that time, it was determined that there would be approxi-
mately 26,000 equivalent 3/4 inch water taps available for
distribution over the next five-year period. That resulted in
a total of 5,200 taps available for distribution per year.
"The total allocation of 5,200 net equivalent 3/4 inch
treated water taps to be allocated each year by the DWB was
then reduced by the estimated amount of water required by the
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City of Denver. The DWB has a charter obligation to accommo-
date all new customers within the City of Denver. For that
reason the availability of new treated water taps for areas
outside the City of Denver, yet within the Denver Water
Board service area, was reduced by the amount of anticipated
taps Denver would be using."' 9
Taps were allocated to suburban distributors on the basis
of a formula which considered historic tap utilization and
the relative percentage of developable remaining within the
distributor's service area. Taps unused in one service area
could be rolled-over into another area but only if the
receiving area had already used at least 90% of its taps.
This requirement, plus the requirement that a tap had to be in
service within a year of its allocation, prevented banking of
taps by developers. Finally, to prevent hardship to devel-
opers who had made substantial financial commitment to con-
struction but hadn't received taps, a relief tap program was
established whereby future taps in the 1980-81 years could be
borrowed from that year and used in 1977.
"The DWB tap allocation program was altered starting with
the second half of 1979. In June, 1979 the DWB voted to in-
crease the annual limit of new water taps from 5,200 to 7,000
per year. The DWB increased the amount of taps available for
several reasons. The major reason is because of the additional
19 Gail Hermsen, The Effect of Water TaD Allocation Programs on
Distribution of Growth in the Denver Region, Denver Regional Council
of Governments, August, 1979, p. 5.
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water which was available due to the success of the Water
Board's tap allocation and conservation programs. In addition,
the non-drought conditions of the past few years have also
lended a more optimistic view of the total water supply
available. The "go-ahead" for the Foothills Water Treatment
Complex also played a part in the decision to increase the
yearly tap allocation limit.
"It does not appear as if this increase in the number of
taps available for allocation per year will result in a sig-
nificant change in the amount of new development that can
occur in the DWB service area when compared to the growth that
has occurred during the two years in which the DWB tap alloca-
tion plan had been in effect. As indicated earlier, the
relief tap program has borrowed into the tap allocation limit
for 1980 and 1981. Approximately 1,400 relief taps are sub-
tracted from the new allocation of 7,000 taps per year, the
result will be an annual availability of 5,600 taps for 1980
as compared to 5,200 for 1978." 20
Effect of Water Tap Program on Growth Distribution
In August 1979, the Denver Regional Council of Govern-
ments (DRCOG) completed a study on "The Effect of Water Tap
Allocation Programs on Distribution of Growth in the Denver
Region." The objective of the study was to determine whether
the limitation of taps in the DWB-serviced suburbs, as com-
pared to Denver, the City of Aurora and other metro cities
-53-
20 Ibid. p. 9.
which have their own water system and like Denver did not
have tap restrictions, affected the spatial distribution of
growth in the metro area. (See Figure 1 for map of these
areas and Table 1 for list of cities with tap programs.) The
study "compared the percentage of growth which was captured
by individual municipalities prior to the initiation of the
DWB tap allocation program in 1977 to the percentage of
growth captured by individual municipalities after the allo-
cation plan to determine if there have been significant
changes."2' The study methodology compares residential init
building permits for the non-allocation period of 1973-76 to
the allocation period of 1977-78.
"The results of this study do not show that the water
tap allocation program had a dramatic and widespread effect
on the distribution of growth in the Denver Region. (See
Table 2.) Certain portions of the metropolitan area, namely
Denver and Aurora, which were not under tap allocation expe-
rienced an increase in the percentage captures of the metro-
politan growth (residential building permits) of the region."
These two cities averaged 26% capture of permits before and
40% capture of permits after the initiation of the program.
"The tap allocation plans did not have a consistent effect of
redistribution of growth to communities without tap allocation
-54-
21 Ibid. p. 2.
22 Ibid. p. 13.
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TABLE 1 23
WATER SERVICE IN THE DENVER REGION
Jurisdictions Totally Served by the Denver Water Board
Bow Mar
Columbine Valley
Denver
Edgewater
Littleton
Mountain View
Sheridan
Wheat Ridge
Jurisdictions Primarily Served by the Denver Water Board
Arapahoe County
Arvada (Raw Water Only)
Broomfield
Cherry Hills Village
Greenwood Village
Jefferson County
Lakewood
Jurisdictions With Their Own Tap Allocation Plan
Brighton*
Broomfield
Golden
Westminster
*has no tap limitation, but does have a limit on sewer hookups
Jurisdictions Under No Tap Allocations
Adams County** Lafayette
Aurora** Longmont
Arvada Louisville
Boulder (City) Northglenn
Boulder County Thornton
Commerce City**
Denver
Englewood
Glendale
**except for small area served by DWB
23 Ibid. p. 3.
limits." Thornton and Arvada, both communities without tap
allocations but with developable land, declined in the per-
centage capture of permits. The DRCOG study finally con-
cluded that "The tap allocation program does not work alone
in guiding the spatial distribution of the region's growth." 24
One criticism of the DRCOG study is that the author didn't
address the question of whether the total limit on taps, that
is 5200 initially, then revised later to 7000 annually, was
sufficiently less than historical tap growth to cause a squeeze
in developer access to taps. A look at tap growth for the DWB
between 1969 and 1972 shows that yearly growth of new taps
averaged 6800 taps. In two big growth years, 1971 and 1973,
annual taps reached the eight to nine thousand level and the
average was significantly exceeded.
In other words, average annual DWB tap growth was about
2.6% in the big growth years of 1969-1972. Since then the
decade of the '70's has seen slower tap growth, in fact,
about half as fast as the 1969-1972 period. Since 1973,
growth in new taps has averaged about 1.3% annually, or about
5300 taps per year.
It is not surprising that the tap allocation program has
a modest effect upon spatial distribution of growth in the
24 Ibid. pt. 16.
25 Denver Water Board Annual Report., 1978, p. 57.
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DWB service area to date. It basically allowed the growth
rate since 1973 to continue with only minor dislocations in
the housing market.
Were the housing market to pick up and resume its growth
trend of the 1969-72 period of 2.7% annually, then it is
likely that the 5100 annual tap limitation would have been
insufficient to meet demand. However, with the action by the
DWB in 1979 to increase the limitation of 7000 taps per year,
there appears to be sufficient tap growth permissible in the
DWB system to accommodate developer demands within its ser-
vice area during strong housing markets, except for perhaps
boom years such as those that occurred in 1971 and 1973.
Effect of Water Tap Allocation Program on Aggregate Metro Growth
During the period of the tap allocation program, the DWB
maintained its policy of not significantly expanding its ser-
vice areas and not adding any new distributors of water out-
side its service areas. The DWB added new taps to its system
at an annual average rate of 1.3% during the 1973-76 period,
as well as the 1977-79 period. Metropolitan growth in popu-
lation also increased in these periods by about 1.1% annually.
Knowing that the DWB continued to serve about 55% of the
metro population during these periods leads one to the con-
clusion that the DWB tap allocation program did not significantly
-58-
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF REGION'S RESIDENTIAL BUILDING PERMITS
Prior to DWB Allocation
1973 1974 1975 1976
DWB Allocation Program
1977 1978 1979'
Jurisdictions Totally
Served by DWB
Littleton
Sheridan
Wheat Ridge
0.4 1.2 1.1 0.8
0.2 NA 0.1 0.1
0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4
0.8 1.4 1.4
0 0 0
0.5 0.1 0.1
Jurisdictions Primarily
Served by DWB
Arapahoe County -.Uninc.
Broomfield
Cherry Hills Village
Greenwood Village
Jefferson County - Uninc.
Lakewood
Jurisdictions With Their
Own Tap Allocation Plan
Brighton
Broomfield
Golden
Westminster
Jurisdictions Under No
Tap Allocations
Adams County - Uninc.
Arvada
Aurora
Boulder
Boulder County - Uninc.
Commerce City
Denver
Englewood
Lafayette
Longmont
Louisville
Northglenn
Thornton
7.4
1.3
0.1
0.1
6.7
8.0
0.7
1.3
2.4
7.3
3.9
9.3
16.3
2.9
4.8
0.1
17.4
0.6
NA
2.5
0.3
0.2
6.0
8.8
1.5
0.3
0.5
13.0
6.4
0.5
1.5
0.1
8.7
2.9
5.6
15.7
4.4
2.5
0.1
15.9
0.6
0.4
4.4
2.0
0.2
3.9
*Indicates years of local tap allocation
1 Through March, 1979
13.2
3.1
0.4
0.8
17.1
3.7
0.5
3.1
0. 4*
6.1
1.5
6.2
13.8
2.9
1.2
0.1
11.7
0.2
4.1
3.8
2.1
0.5
5.1
13.3
1.4
0.2
0.9
17.1
2.7
1.0
1.4
0.2*
8.1
1.0
6.4
14.6
4.6
3.4
0.1
11.4
0.9
0.9
6.7
1.1
0.1
1.9
13.5
2.3
0.2
0.7
14.2
4.6
0.5
2.3
0.1*
7.2
0.8
5.9
19.4
4.9
2.7
0.1
10.5
0.1
1.1
4.9
0.8
0.3
3.8
12.0
1.0
0.1
0.3
12.2
4.6
0.5*
1.0
0.2*
7.0*
1.0
3.7
22.4
2.8
2.2
0.1
18.0
0.3
1.1
4.2
1.0
0.3
3.5
8.7
0.7*
0.2
0.1
11.2
7.9
0.7*
0.7*
0. 2*
6.4*
1.6
3.2
25.9
4.3
1.8
1.3
14.2
0.1
0.8
3.6
1.3
0.3
3.1
26 Ibid. p. 14.
programs.
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reduce aggregate metro population growth. As discussed
in the previous section, it is likely that suppliers of water
not dependent upon the DWB increased tap availability to
accommodate growth outside the DWB service area. A number of
large jurisdictions independent of the DWB with developable
land such as Aurora, Northglenn, and Thornton imposed no tap
limitation program during this period and en.joyed continued or
increased rates of population growth.
COULD THE DWB SERVE AS AN ELEMENT IN A GROWTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM?
As noted in an EPA report on the Foothills water treatment
plant, it is frequently suggested or even stated a fact that
the DWB should and could serve as an instrument in growth
management in the Denver metro area. In Chapter 1, case
studies were presented in which water service policy was an
element in effective growth management. Six prerequisites for
the establishment of water service policy as a growth manage-
ment tool were developed from the case studies and planning
literature. This section summarizes the water policy experience
and institutional history of the DWB in the context of these
six prerequisites. The purpose of this analysis is to draw
a conclusion as to the feasibility and desirability of the
DWB serving as a growth management agency.
27 EPA, Region 8, Denver Regional Environmental Impact Statement for
Wastewater Facilities and the Clean Water Plan, April, 1978.
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Geographical Congruence
Most discussions of growth management in the Denver metro
28
area focus upon the issue of sprawl. It is an urban area of
relatively low density characterized by spread out, leapfrog
and strip development patterns. Employment centers are not
highly centralized which causes a large degree of cross-
commuting without the benefit of rapid transit facilities.
Government in the Denver metro area also sprawls. When
Charles Bernard researched this topic in 1970, he found that
"Metro Denver's local governments are a patchwork arrangement.
Governments--municipal, county and special district--are
stacked one upon another in response to ad hoc demands.
Special purpose districts abound and proliferate on the
sprawling urban fringe to meet demands for fire protection,
water and sewer services, and other urban services without
reference to any long-range planning or projection of future
development." " Wryly commenting on this situation, Bernard
titled his study "Metro Denver:Mile High Government," obvi-
ously referring to more than Denver's altitude.
Regarding water service, it has already been noted that
while the DWB is a major supplier of water, it is far from
28 This information based upon an interview with John Parr, Director,
Governor's Front Range Task Force, July, 1980.
29 William Bernard, Metro Denver:Mile High Government, Bureau of
Governmental Research and Studies, Univ. of Colorado, 1970, p. 11.
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the sole supplier. In a 1975 report for the Colorado State
Legislature, Denver is one of 26 "major suppliers" listed in
the Denver area with about 60% of the 1975 supply.3 1
If the question was whether the DWB could impact spatial
distribution of growth strictly within the City of Denver, it
is clear that there are no geographical limitations preventing
such a policy. By definition, the DWB service area completely
encompasses the boundaries of Denver proper eliminating any
possibility of geographical inconsistency between the utility
service area and the planning area in question. There is also
some evidence that is indicative but not conclusive that the
DWB tap allocation program operates in such a way to modestly
shift some growth from suburban areas to the core city of the
region.
However, the major growth management issue of the region
is not curbing or stimulating growth in the City of Denver
per se but dealing with urban sprawl. The evidence garnered
from the DWB's experience with the 1950's Blue Line and its
1970's policy of limited service area additions persuasively
suggests that during those periods the DWB had little impact
upon aggregate growth in the metro area. The key to its lack
of influence was the lack of congruence between its service
30 Metropolitan Water Requirements and Resources, of. cit.,
Vol. 1, p. 51.
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area and the authority of suburban jurisdictions. Of its 337
square miles of area served, 115 square miles comprises Denver
and 222 square miles are in other jurisdictions. Two thirds
of the DWB's area is outside the City of Denver. Its Blue
Line simply was not expansive enough to cover available growth
sites and, more importantly, the DWB was not legally enabled
to prevent alternative water supply systems from being estab-
lished (had it been inclined to do so which it wasn't). It was
and is a legal creature of the City of Denver and can only con-
trol the water investment decisions of suburban entities to
the extent they voluntarily agree to do so through distributor
contracts.
An enormous number of factors other than water service
policy impact growth. Admittedly, the degree of causality
between this conslusion and the evidence in the chapter is
difficult to conclusively affirm. However, the author believes
that the conclusions stated are reasonable inferences from the
data available. On the basis of the criteria of geographical
congruence, the DWB could not have qualified during this
period as being an effective candidate in regional growth
management.
Availability of a Regional Growth Plan
Like many large urban areas, the general purpose govern-
ments in the Denver metro area have formed an organization to
further regional cooperation. The Denver Regional Council of
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Governments (DRCOG) serves this purpose. "It has neither
taxing powers nor immediate authority over metro Denver govern-
ments." 31 It does have review authority over federal grants-
in-aid and it is eligible to receive federal area-wide planning
grants. It does develop regional plans in a general sense
such as defining, what it terms, the regional urban service
area boundaries. Again, local government compliance with
DRCOG plans is voluntary.
The previously discussed case studies demonstrate that
effective use of water service as a growth management tool
requires preparation of a statement of growth objectives
developed on a regional basis, if at all possible. Further-
more, these objectives must be related to a detailed water
service capital improvements plan. Neither of these plans
exist in sufficient depth and detail to actually help the DWB
or any other major water supplier comply with regional growth
management objectives (should they wish to do so).
The DWB has been notifying DRCOG of impending requests
for water service area extensions since it authorized limited
expansions in 1979. It is the only water supplier in the metro
32
area to do so. DRCOG's comments are viewed both by the DWB
and DRCOG staff as advisory. In most cases the comments have
been confined to matters relating to possible floodplains,
31 William Bernard, op. cit., p. 60.
32 Interview with David Pampu, Deputy Director, DRCOG, June 1980.
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wildlife habitat, or transportation difficulties. The DWB
sees these issues of concern to the community in which the
addition is located. In only one case in the recent past was
a proposed service area addition beyond the DRCOG urban ser-
vice area boundary. This was the Hogback addition to the Ken
Caryl development previously mentioned. After review and
negotiation, DRCOG revised its urban service area to include
the proposed addition.
The question of proper development of a regional growth
plan can be viewed as a "chicken and egg" process. The DWB
and other such municipal service providers have no such plan
available to guide them. On the other hand, DRCOG is unlikely
to develop a coherent enforceable plan until its membership,
local government, agrees that one is necessary. The DWB and
other urban utilities have certainly not come forward pushing
for such a regional plan or even strongly hinting that one
should be developed.
Impetus for development of such enforceable plans rarely
comes initially from within the institutions responsible for
accommodating growth. A fundamental consensus must exist
within the body politic of a community before elected officials
endorse growth management as a legitimate community goal. The
Denver metro area has seen limited growth management sentiment
surface in some communities, notably Boulder and Northglenn.
The City of Westminster approved by public referendum, a plan
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to pace growth by means of supplying water and sewer services.
Even rapdily growing Aurora has exhibited some very recent
interest in stimulating infilling and slowing growth beyond its
urban fringe. However, none of this sentiment has achieved
the breadth of support across the metro area to convince
governmental leaders that a regional approach to growth manage-
ment is an essential responsibility of theirs. Until this
happens, the DWB will continue to operate without benefit of
a legitimate regional growth plan.
Water Service Policy as an Element in Growth Management Policy
The DWB has resisted the notion that its duties as a sup-
plier of water could and should be tied to the pursuit of non-
utility objectives. Further, the Charter of Denver has afforded
the DWB the opportunity to achieve public policy isolation for
its system.
A few Charter quotes illustrate this independence. "There
shall be and hereby is created a non-political Board of Water
Commissioners of five members, to have complete charge and
control of a water works system and plant for supplying the
City and County of Denver and its inhabitants with water for
all uses and purposes... The Board shall have and exercise
all the powers of the City and County of Denver including those
granted by the Constitution and by the law of the State of
Colorado and by the Charter in regard to ... conducting and
operating a water works system..." In an extensive study of
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the DWB, James Cox concluded "The DWB succeeded in maintaining
its independence from the city administration and city council.
Even though some mayors have been able to appoint a majority
of the board members, they have not found it possible to exer-
cise any considerable control or direction over the decision of
the board." 33 Bernard in his study of metro government found
that "probably the most significant features of the water
board's power are its authority to establish its own rules
and regulations and to set the conditions and rates under
which it will furnish water inside and outside the City and
34
County of Denver."
Given this independence, it's difficult to conceive the
DWB being willing to voluntarily participate as a part of a
growth management system even assuming one existed for the
region. The DWB has even ignored the entreaties of its parent
government, the City of Denver, to help achieve even the broad-
est of goals of the Denver Planning Office. As Bernard noted,
"In exercising its authority, the board has never utilized its
position as a supplier of water (perhaps the only feasible one)
to an area to force that area's annexation to Denver. This
practice, quite common in other metropolitan areas where the
central city has gained a partial or complete monopoly of
water supply, has not been a feature of intergovernmental
relations in Metro Denver. This fact probably results
33 James Cox, op. cit., p. 96.
34 William Bernard, op. cit., p. 54.
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largely from the board's virtual independence of and isolation
from the other elements of Denver's city government."35
Exclusionary Tests
There is very little likelihood that the DWB's operation
could be found exclusionary. The DWB aggressively plans for
system growth in terms of raw water supply, storage facilities,
treatment plants, and distribution systems. "The Denver Water
Department continues to plan ahead to provide quality water
at the lowest possible cost for the Denver area. State and
regional planners expect the Denver water system will need to
supply water to an increasing number of persons. A combina-
tion of additional raw water development ... and promotion of
water conservation is expected to provide the Denver area with
a safe, adequate water supply for the future." 36
The few times in its history when it found itself in
tight supply situations, it refused to accept such conditions
as permanent and took positive steps to end such restrictions
on system growth. Speaking of the Blue Line of the '50's
Cox stated, "As Denver secured additional supplies, it dis-
continued its restrictions on outside of Denver service." 37
In point of fact, the DWB invested $80,000,000 in a huge trans-
mountain diversion project which doubled its supply.
If the test of exclusionary policies is, to rephrase
Ramapo, that a community confronts the challenges of population
a5 William Bernard, OD. cit., p. 54.
36 Features of the Denver Water System, DWB, December 1976, p. 69.
3 James Cox, op. cit., p. 148.
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growth with closed doors, then it is very likely on the basis
of 62 years of history that the DWB, even if it were partici-
pating in a growth management system, would not fail such a
test. Its institutional objectives are to accommodate growth
and it has the fiscal and technical capacity to achieve this.
Growth Management and Political Accountability
As noted in Chapter 1, any governmental institution that
endeavors to restrict land use or development patterns must be
fully recognized within its community as having the authority
to do so. Much current political rhetoric speaks to a perceived
tendency of governmental bodies to arrogate to themselves
powers extrapolated far from their original purpose. One
prominent national developer states, "We are on the verge of
adopting or accepting the concept that, although the title
to property may be held by a private person, its development
rights belong to society. Regulations, more sweeping than
those envisioned by proponents of zoning, restrict and control
even the smallest developments .. ." 38 Another complains that
"the failure of public planning to manage urban growth has
made private developers highly visible scapegoats." a These
statements reflect concern about both the legitimacy of growth
management itself and the rights of communities to pursue and
implement growth management policies.
38 Ray Drackman, "Land Use Under Current Restraints," Management and
Control of Growth, Edited by Randall Scott, Urban Land Institute,
Washington, D.C., 1975, Vol. 3 p. 506.
3 9 Robert Larson, "Growth is a Metropolitan Issue," Ibid., Vol. 3
p. 485.
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Given this skepticism about the use of the police power,
it is difficult to make the case that the DWB is a proper
institution in which to invest such authority. Its independence
from even elected officials within its parent jurisdiction is
well established. As Cox points out, "The framers of the
charter amendment creating the DWB were determined to create
an agency that would be removed, as far as possible, from
politics. By creating a board, rather than a department direct-
ly responsible to the Mayor, it was hoped that the influence
of the Mayor upon board policies would be reduced." 40 As an
example of the success of this policy is that only now, in 1980,
is the Denver City government proposing that in the fall a
Charter amendment be referred to Denver's voters allowing
removal of a DWB Commissioner for cause.
Suburban communities clearly have much more reason to be
concerned about DWB political accountability were it to move
into the arena of growth management. While one can make the
argument that Denverites have some tenuous hold on DWB policy
by virtue of the Denver Mayor's appointment power of the DWB
Commissioners, suburban residents are totally excluded from
this process. They justifiably fear the power of a core city
authority which is completely unaccountable to them to make
decisions affecting their communities' long term future. Many
argue that the DWB is far too unrepresentative of metropolitan-
wide interests now to make even utility-related judgements
40 James Cox, op. cit., p. 95.
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affecting non-Denver communities. It is no accident that it
was a suburban congressman, Representative Tim Wirth of
Jefferson County, who felt the need and saw the opportunity
to successfully mediate resolution of the Foothills Treatment
Plant controversy. It is also no accident that one of the
key terms of settlement was the establishment of a Citizens
41
Advisory Committee to the DWB with four of its nine seats
reserved for suburban interests.
The structure of the DWB was carefully crafted to achieve
a single purpose with as much efficiency and as little political
interference as possible. It doesn't have strong ties of
accountability to a metro body politic. Without such account-
ability to a community, its political legitimacy as an active
player in metro growth management is suspect.
Colorado Utility Law and Growth Management
The legal cases cited in Chapter 1 illustrate that
judicial review of the concept of water service policy as an
element of growth management is a mixed bag. The facts of
the case, the state in which it is argued, and the jurisdic-
tion of the federal or state courts all bear on the legal
outcome. Colorado law is not immune from this confusion.
In Robinson v. Boulder 42 the court held that in providing
water service outside its boundary, Boulder acted like a
utility and therefore was impressed with the obligations
41 Upon which the author serves as a public interest member and a
representative of the Denver Chapter of Colorado Common Cause.
42 Robinson v. Boulder, 547 P2d 228 (1976)
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of a utility. One such obligation is to provide service upon
demand unless some utility-related exigency prevented it from
reasonably doing so. Boulder was precluded from considering
growth management as a factor in the utility extension decision
process. On appeal the lower court ruling was sustained.
43
However, in a previous case, Englewood v. Denver, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that Denver, even though it sold
substantial quantities of water to a customer (Englewood) out-
side its boundaries, was not a public utility because the
water sales were merely "incidental" to Denver's primary pur-
pose in owning and operating a water system; that purpose
being to supply water to its municipally-bounded population.
Though this discussion does not purport to represent
thorough legal research on the subject, the author's conver-
sations with several attorneys, active in the practice of
utility law, leads him to the following conclusion. A water
service agency might not be restricted in the use of its
authority to deny service for non-utility reasons if the
agency is not found to be a public utility per se.
The DWB has assiduously avoided being classified as a
public utility. As shown in the Englewood case, it has pre-
vailed in court on this matter in 1951 with a specific
43 Englewood v. Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 229 P2d 667 (1951)
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factual situation. Moreover, the DWB specifically prepares
its distributor contracts in such a fashion as to not hold
itself out as a utility to the community being served by that
distributor.44 This has been done with the primary motivation
of escaping regulation of the Colorado Public Utility Com-
mission which can assert jurisdiction over municipal utilities
when they are acting outside their boundaries in the manner
of a utility.
If the DWB was deemed to be acting as a utility in the
provision of its service to suburban areas, it probably would
not be in a legal position to participate in a growth manage-
ment system. So far, it has not and definitely does not want
to fall into such a category. It can therefore be argued that
no court has yet established legal impediments to the DWB
utilizing water service for non-utility purposes. The DWB is
not anxious to test this principle, principally because it
wishes to continue to enjoy independence from the rate review
and other powers of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission.
Given the findings of Robinson it is impossible to state with
certainty whether the DWB could participate in a growth man-
agement system.
There may be an alternative governmental structure that
might assume the responsibilities of water service which could
more easily qualify legally as a participant in a growth man-
agement system. This alternative is discussed in the next
chapter.
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44 Bob Jensen, op. cit.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
The DWB is a powerful influence in the provision of water
service to the Denver metro area. Its actions definitely can
affect locational decisions of specific development projects.
It has not been, however, an all-powerful agency. The history
of water service in the metro area over the last 30 years
indicates that an absence of water service to a particular
community by the DWB has not precluded development within
that community. In the past, significant water project invest-
ments have been undertaken by non-DWB entities. The DWB has
accommodated much growth in the Denver metro area but is
probably not the determinant factor in promoting or curbing
aggregate metro population growth.
Such a conclusion is not surprising once one has com-
pared the DWB with the six prerequisites for a water service
agency to be an effective participant in a metro growth man-
agement system. The DWB has not had sufficient geographical
congruence with the total metro area. There is not a con-
sensus on a regional growth plan and its objectives. The
DWB has resisted being part of any growth management system.
The legal authority for the DWB to participate in a growth
management system is unclear.
The question arises as to whether the circumstances of
the last 30 years which permitted water supply development
by non-DWB entities would prevail in the future. One might
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argue that the past is not prologue and only the DWB is cap-
able of raising the capital to invest in water supply projects
which are very much more expensive in the '80's than the '50's.
This argument suggests that the easy to develop water of the
'50's is no longer available and suburban communities are not
in a position to invest in large water system projects.
In a recent briefing, the DWB presented its 20-year
forecast of water service requirements based upon Denver
Regional Council of Governments population projections. While
it expects to be serving several hundred thousand more people
by the year 2000 in a somewhat larger service area, its pro-
portion of the metro population served is only expected to
climb slightly to 59%.
Current forecasts by both DRCOG and the DWB anticipate
substantial water supply investments by non-DWB agencies.
Much of this investment may take the form of acquisition and
condemnation of Eastern Slope agricultural water rights.
One Colorado water expert believes that there is substantial
reason to believe that there is enough agricultural water to
accommodate a many fold growth increase in the Denver area.
He further states that several suburban cities are likely to
develop such supplies. While these forecasts are problematic,
the author does not believe the DWB will acquire a monopoly
over new water supplies.
15 Interview with Bill McDonald, Director, Colorado Water Conservation
Board, July, 1980.
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Chapter 3 explores the possibility of a successor agency
to the DWB, a regional water service agency, as a more
effective participant in regional growth management.
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CHAPTER 3
A PROPOSAL FOR A DENVER METRO WATER AGENCY
The previous chapters have provided sufficient evidence
to conclude that the Denver Water Board is not appropriately
structured to curb urban sprawl by itself. Questions have
also been raised which cast doubt upon the legal status of
the Denver Water Board to pursue non-utility purposes beyond
its municipality's jurisdiction. Finally, the political
"critical mass" necessary to achieve consensus on growth man-
agement objectives and hence a regional growth plan while
simmering has not solidified.
This chapter proposes one institutional alternative to
the Denver Water Board as a means of utilizing water service
policy in a Denver metro growth management system. The alter-
native is the creation of a new governmental entity, a metro
water service agency. It should be carefully noted that the
author is not advocating the creation of such an agency. He
is pointing out that if at some time water service policy is
to be considered as a growth management technique in the
Denver area, planners should logically consider establishment
of some institution along the lines of a new metro water
agency.
The proposal that follows is a speculative design of a
water service agency that explicitly considers the criteria
for effectiveness 'developed in the previous chapters.
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The boundary and service area size issue is addressed. A
legal structure that would permit non-utility purposes to be
considered in the water distribution function is suggested.
Reform of the governance structure is proposed to make a new
agency more accountable to metro-wide interests. The questions
of who develops the growth management plans and how a water
agency fits into municipal and county growth management sys-
tems are also raised.
In short, this chapter describes an outline of what would
have to be created to achieve leverage in the use of water
service for growth management. It covers the key features
and institutional reforms of an alternative to the Denver
Water Board and similar municipal water agencies and briefly
examines some of the obstacles in getting there.
SERVICE AREA SIZE
A new metro water agency would have to be truly regional
in its coverage. If the problems which developed beyond the
borders of the Denver Water Board when it established its
Blue Line are to be avoided, a metro water agency would have
to include in its service area most of the developable land
likely to demand water service for a long period of time.
Such a service area would include most, if not all major
municipal jurisdictions in the path of development to pre-
clude another round of independent investment in water supply
systems for those whose property is denied or deferred water
availability for growth management reasons.
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The startling point for determining service area size is
the current Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG)
Urban Service Area boundaries. This includes the City of
Denver, the non-mountainous portions of Jefferson County to
the west of Denver, the non-mountainous portions of Boulder
County, southwestern Adams County, and western Arapahoe County
(see Map 2). This corresponds roughly to the Denver SMSA.
DRCOG is currently revising its Urban Service Area bound-
aries. The significant amendments take in the northern por-
tions of Douglas County to reflect growth southward of the
Denver metro fringe along 1-25 highway. In particular, the
Mission Viejo new city will obviously be integrated into the
metro area.
The inclusion of large portions of non-mountainous
Boulder County in a new metro water agency may appear prob-
lematic. While a portion of the SMSA, the City of Boulder has
initiated a program to limit its growth and physically remain
isolated from the sprawl of the Denver megalopolis. It is
still sufficiently far from Denver (30 miles) to try to main-
tain its identity as a non-Denver metro community. The City
of Boulder has a well-funded greenbelt program and has
aggressively acquired agricultural land on its borders. None-
theless, a path of development is steadily pushing along the
major Boulder-Denver highway route bringing suburbanization
directly into Boulder County. This trend is unlikely to be
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halted without more direct local government actions than have
occurred to date.
Jurisdictionally, a new metro water agency should incorpo-
rate within its boundaries the service areas of current major
water supply agencies. This would include the Denver Water
Board, Aurora, Englewood, Thornton, Northglenn, Arvada, West-
minster, Golden, and Boulder.
Again, the purpose of carving out such a huge territory
for service by a new water agency is two fold. First, new
investment in water service and supply facilities would be
under the influence of a single agency thus precluding extra-
territorial development of water service capital facilities.
Second, the externalities, caused by uncoordinated water
supply decisions, of one community's growth management efforts
spilling over upon neighboring communities could be minimized.
A metro water agency would meet the geographical congruence
prerequisite presented in the previous chapters.
LEGAL STRUCTURE
A metro water agency must, of course, be imbued with all
the necessary powers to own and operate a complete water works
system including rights of eminent domain, rate setting auth-
ority, contractual powers, authority to incur debt, etc. In
addition, to achieve the objective of utilizing water service
policy to assist growth management, it must have the following
characteristics:
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1. the right to provide services conditioned upon
certain non-utility related objectives such as
location and type of development,
2. the right to act without being overruled by
individual jurisdictions within its service area,
in particular, home rule governments, and
3. exemption from regulation by the Colorado Public
Utilities Commission (PUC).
The following legal structures are proposed as possible
means to achieve the above. The author believes these struc-
tures would not fail obvious tests of statutory and constitu-
tional validity. He does not hold out this discussion as a
definitive legal brief but rather an avenue of further legal
inquiry.
One mdoel for a metro water service agency in the Denver
area is the legislatively created regional district. The
Denver area's surface transit entity, the Regional Transporta-
tion District (RTD) is an example. Created by the Colorado
Legislature, the RTD is a unique form of regional special pur-
pose government. It has three special characteristics.
First, while not tested in a court of law, it appears
the RTD is not subject to regulation by the Colorado Public
Utilities Commission. The PUC has declined to assert juris-
diction over the RTD. Second, the RTD has an established
regional purpose thus avoiding conflict with the sovereignty
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assigned home rule cities for certain services by the Colorado
Constitution.' Therefore, local governments are precluded
from establishing competing bus or transit services. Third
and most importantly, because a metro water service agency
which had boundaries large enough that it would not be acting
extraterritorially would be akin to a municipal entity acting
within its borders and thus immune to classic utility law
requirements which might inhibit pursuit of non-utility objec-
tives. Obviously, the Colorado Legislature could make this
point explicit in the creation of such an agency.
One important distinction between the RTD model and the
desired metro water agency's legal structure would be its
manner of governance. This is key to the question of politi-
cal accountability.
'Another possible legal structure for a metro agency
already exists in Colorado law. Pursuant to a 1970 Constitu-
tional amendment, the legislature in 1972 enacted the Service
Authority Act. This bill authorizes popularly elected region-
al government for certain enumerated purposes after a vote
of the residents in the jurisdictions affected. Specifically
included among the services which may be designated is
"domestic water collection, treatment, and distribution." 2
'Metro Capital Improvement District v. Adams County, Colo. case
decided Feb. 12, 1962. In this case a statutorily formed Metro Capital
Improvements Agency was declared unconstitutional because it was not truly
regional in purpose but rather only a financing mechanism for channeling
tax dollars into individual community public improvements. It imposed
duties upon home rule communities in conflict with those cities' rights
of self-determination under the Colorado Constitution.
2 32-7-111(1) (a) Colorado Revised Statutes 1973
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Unlike the case of the Regional Transportation District which
appears to be exempt from PUC regulation, it is not clear
from the text of the Service Authority Act what utility char-
acteristics are implicit in a metro agency formed under its
auspices. As noted in a succeeding section, a regional plan-
ning entity formed pursuant to this law is to be voted upon
in the Denver metro area in November, 1980. A metro water
agency is not a part of this proposal.
METRO WATER AGENCY GOVERNANCE
One of the problems with the Denver Water Board governance
structure, if it became involved in the field of growth man-
agement, is that its appointed board is not representative of
all those it serves, specifically non-Denver residents. A
method of representation to provide accountability to all
within its service area is an essential requirement. Multi-
jurisdictional representation would have to be an element of
the agency's governance.
A second issue is whether representation should be the
result of appointment by local governments (as is the case
with RTD) or by direct popular election. Political science
theorists debate the pros and cons of these two approaches.
The author believes that at some point in the process of
establishing growth management objectives for a metropolitan
area, accountability must be provided directly to citizens by
means of popular election.
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This is not to say that the water service agency board
must be elected. An alternative can be the establishment of
an elected regional planning body which would be vested with
sufficient authority to establish a regional growth plan and
require the water service agency to comply with the provisions
of such a plan. In this case the water agency, while having
the latitude to make judgements about how to best accomplish
the regional plan's polciies, would nonetheless be bound by
these policies. It would not be as critical that the metro
water board members be elected since political accountability
had been built into the process of developing the regional
growth plan itself.
An effort in this direction is underway at this time.
A coalition of DRCOG officials, progressive interests, and
the League of Women Voters has drafted a proposal for a
regional planning authority with a popularly elected board
pursuant to the Service Authority Act of 1972. Having twice
failed to obtain state legislative approval of the plan, this
coalition conducted a successful petition campaign to have
the issue placed on the November 1980 general election ballot
by popular initiative.
If the proposal were to pass elections, it would sub-
sequently be held in 15 districts within the 4-county metro
area to provide direct citizen representation on the new
regional palnning authority. In such a case, the need for
directly elected representatives on a metro water agency
-85-
is diminished. So long as the water agency's growth manage-
ment actions were consistent with the policies and plans
established either by the popularly elected regional planning
authority or by local governments, the legitimacy of the
water agency's growth management decisions would be less
questionable.
REGIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS AND OBJECTIVES
The fundamental role of water service policy in a com-
prehensive plan must be clearly specified. It is the author's
belief that the role would be to help control the location
and timing of growth, principally large commercial and resi-
dential development projects. The purpose of these measures
would be to curb extensive, low-density sprawl.
It is unlikely the metro water agency would be able to
participate in a plan with the objective of limiting aggre-
gate urban population growth. While a few communities in
the planning literature have been noted for growth limitation
efforts, Petaluma and Ramapo for example, it appears that
they have not dampened aggregate demand for housing and
employment opportunities in their region. Whatever growth
they don't fully accommodate shifts to neighboring communities
within their region.
Studies of the Denver metro area suggest the same con-
clusion. Speaking of water restrictions that could affect
amenity values in the metro area, one study concludes that
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"In all likelihood, these restrictions would be insufficient
to noticeably affect amenity-driven locational decisions and
consequent population growth." 3  "Within wide limits, water
use restrictions would be unlikely to become important con-
siderations in the locational decisions of either households
or business firms." ' In other words, there are very strong
external forces driving growth in the Denver area. Only the
severest water restrictions would measurably lessen these
growth pressures. In the author's judgement, it is unlikely
a plan could be formulated which would limit migration to the
Denver area by means of water availability without impacts so
severe to the existing population that the measures would be
found unacceptable.
With the understanding that a metro water agency's non-
utility objective is to affect distribution and timing of
growth, it is next important to determine where the agency
looks for guidance to implement this policy. Who plans
where growth is to occur and when.
Ideally, a regional planning agency would provide util-
ity agencies with a comprehensive growth and development plan
for the region detailing the role of utility agencies in its
implementation. As noted in Chapter 1, for reasons of
3 LTW Assoc., Water and Growth:An Inquiry Into the Potential Impact
of Municipal Water Use Restrictions Upon Future Growth of The Colorado
Front Range Corridor, Research Report 79-1 prepared for the Colorado
Dept. of Natural Resources, February 1979, p. 44.
4 Ibid. p. 50
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both practicality and legal adequacy, a comprehensive plan is
the cornerstone of a growth management system.
Experience with metro planning agencies suggests that
they are unlikely to produce enforceable growth management
plans which are the result of a regional consensus. In a
less than ideal world, a metro water agency would have to
seek plausible second best solutions for achieving growth
management objectives. In particular, the metro water agency
would probably first sacrifice a regional view encompassing
every one of its jurisdictions in favor of subregional views.
It would look toward the planning objectives of local units
of government and where it could identify common elements
adopt them as its own in cooperation with those governments.
Utility planners, then, would look to the subregional
comprehensive plans for the following:
1. What population growth is expected over at least
a two-decade period in order for the water agency
to plan for the necessary additional raw and
treated water supplies needed,
2. Which paths of development and infill are envi-
sioned as candidates for extension of services,
3. What is the anticipated timing of development in
new service areas, that is, how is growth to be
staged, and
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4. Given that treated water is available for distri-
bution to new service areas, how many taps are to
be allocated for service from those distribution
mains over what period of time and who is to
receive them.
The metro water agency under this proposal would be a
limited decision maker as far as the fundamental urban growth
goals for the area are concerned. It chiefly would be an
implementation agent on behalf of local governments to help
them achieve broad objectives around the logical distribution
and timing of development.
To accomplish its twin objectives, the metro water agency
would first have to plan to accommodate growth within its
broad service area. This would require it looking to an
accountable regional planning agency for long term population
growth projections. It would be making its major capital
investment decisions, such as when and where to obtain major
new raw water supplies based on these population projections.
To help guide locational decisions, the metro water
agency would work closely with local units of government to
help them use water service policy as a key element of their
comprehensive planning and zoning activity. The water agency
would have to set standard terms on which this would be
accomplished so that non-exclusionary outcomes would be pre-
cluded and developers would be facing consistent policies
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regarding tap fees, engineering requirements for utility
hookups, participation charges and the like. Within such
policies, municipalities would be providing tap allocations
and making the actual decisions about who receives services
for what specific types of development.
In unincorporated areas, the metro water agency would
establish criteria to encourage development close to existing
development and service facilities. County government, while
ultimately responsible for zoning and subdivision approval
in unincorporated areas, would be aware of the metro water
agency's preference for development logically related to
existing treatment and water distribution lines. Developers
in these cases would have to seek tap allocations from the
metro water agency since no municipal government would, at
least initially, be in a position to provide service beyond
its borders to such unincorporated developments. A reasonable
exception to this procedure would be when a regional planning
agency or the metro water agency could make a finding with a
local municipal unit that annexation of a potential develop-
ment to that municipality was desirable. In such cases the
metro agency could authorize that municipality to provide taps
to the unincorporated development on condition of annexation.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The notion of a metro water agency is by no means new.
Numerous studies have pointed out that "the Denver Water
Board has quietly and effectively transformed itself into
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a de facto metropolitan corporation." " As Cox points out,
"Even though the Denver Water Board, from a legal standpoint,
is not a metropolitan agency, its scope of operations is more
nearly metropolitan-wide than any other service-performing
entity in the area." He goes on to say that "a political
consciousness existed in the Denver metropolitan area for a
regional water supply agency and that this agency could serve
as a transitional device toward further governmental integra-
tion in the area." His motive in suggesting this is to pro-
mote governmental efficiency in the metro area.
Both in 1974 and 1975, bills were introduced in the
Colorado Legislature to create a metro water district. The
first of these, House Bill 1131, was sponsored by two sub-
urban legislators whose desire it was to make the Denver Water
Board less accountable to Denver and more a creature of sub-
urban jurisdictions. It didn't get out of committee. The
following year, House Bill 1308 was introduced by a different
set of suburban legislators. Its contents were identical to
the previous year's bill and it suffered the same fate. They
were both killed by Denver legislators who saw their City
having one of its powerful agencies being reshaped toward sub-
urban interests without anything in return being provided by
the suburbs to assist the core city.
5 William Bernard, Metro Denver:Mile High Government, Bureau of
Governmental Research, Univ. of Colorado, 1970, p. 55.
6 James Cox, Metropolitan Water Supply:The Denver Experience, Bureau
of Governmental Research, Univ. of Colorado, 1967, p. 164.
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About the same time, the Legislature authorized a study
to determine what utility-related advantages could be enjoyed
by a metro water agency. It concluded that a hypothetical
metro water agency would achieve modest cost savings of about
5% over a 30-year period in contrast to present arrangements
of supplying water to the metro area.7  It also found that
a metro water agency would provide improved water quality,
water availability, and general water service to the metro
population. In an obvious understatement, the report recog-
nized that "while the desire for a metropolitan-wide water
agency to solve the problems appears clear to everyone,
there is no consensus regarding details of the structure and
responsibility of such an agency. "8 In other words, the
jurisdictional and political ramifications of a metro water
agency overwhelmed the benefits of the proposed agency.
Growth management issues were not a part of this study.
Cox points out why "attitudes are essentially negative
toward the proposition of integrating the many water supply
facilities in the area into a single metropolitan system."9
First, several suburban communities have made substantial
financial investments in their systems and enjoy the autonomy
from the Denver Water Board these investments have brought
them. Second, Denver officials and citizens are reluctant to
relinquish their influence over the Denver Water Board, no
7 Metropolitan Water Requirements and Resources:1975-2010, Colorado
State Legislature, 1975, p. 135.
8 Ibid. p. 23.
9James Cox, op. cit., p. 168.
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matter how nominal, without significant assistance from the
suburbs, probably in the form of some sort of tax base sharing.
Other factors might compel some structural changes for
the Denver Water Board. A recent report from the Colorado
Taxpayers Association noted that the Water Board needed sub-
stantial new capital to complete large water supply projects.
It would have difficulty gaining Denver voter approval of a
new bond issue for such purposes. On the basis of more posi-
tive feelings for water supply projects among its suburban
constituency, a metro-wide bond issue might stand a better
chance for approval. In other words, out of need for capital,
the Denver Water Board might have to structure a greater sub-
urban role in its activities.
In general, discussions about the pros and cons of a
metro water agency have not centered upon such an agency's
role in regional growth management. With the exception of
modest proposals from the Denver Regional Council of Govern-
ments, urban planning motivations for a metro water agency
have been minimal. It is likely that were a metro water
agency to be created, its genesis would be water supply
related. Hopefully, other water service policy issues such
as growth management could be raised at that time.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
The outline of a metro water agency for the Denver area
is presented. The proposed agency is fashioned to meet the
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requirements for a water agency to participate in the region's
growth management system. It is designed to be geographically
congruent with the areas of growth potential. It is legally
structured to allow for water service to be used in conjunc-
tion with growth management objectives. Its governance is the
accountability of the residents of the urban area. Its role in
implementing regional and local government comprehensive
plans is outlined.
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